The European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRM Act) entered into force on 23 May 2024. Its stated aim is to secure the supply of critical raw materials for EU member states, with an emphasis on expanding domestic capacity to extract, process, and recycle. The policy context is clear in the same record: at the time of the proposal, Europe depended on China for 98% of its rare-earth needs, 97% of its lithium supply, and 93% of its magnesium supply. This import exposure makes external partnerships more than optional. It makes them a practical route to diversify supply and strengthen resilience for energy-transition and digital technologies.
Saudi Arabia is positioning critical minerals at the center of economic diversification under Vision 2030, with a focus that extends beyond mining into processing and downstream manufacturing. One domestic driver is the Kingdom’s clean energy agenda, which includes a stated target of 130GW by 2030, with 50% coming from renewable energy sources. In parallel, Saudi Arabia’s Critical Minerals Strategy includes a commitment of $100 billion in mining investments by 2035, with $75 billion already allocated to active projects. A separate public estimate also says Saudi Arabia plans to invest $46 billion in mining by 2030, focusing on critical metals for batteries and renewables.
Why the CRM Act Makes Partnerships a Strategic Requirement
The CRM Act is also shaping how Europe thinks about collaboration. Academic analysis describes the EU’s approach as embedding critical minerals trade and investment partnerships within the Critical Raw Materials Act as a legal articulation of supply-chain diplomacy. The same analysis notes that the EU has signed Memoranda of Understanding with Canada, Ukraine, Namibia, Kazakhstan, Argentina, Chile, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Zambia, Greenland, Rwanda, Uzbekistan, Australia, and Serbia as part of its outward-looking trade strategy. That pattern matters for the Gulf. At the EU-GCC summit in October 2024, the two blocs agreed to “secure resilient energy supply chains including on clean technologies, raw materials and critical minerals,” creating an explicit platform for expanded engagement.
For Europe, the point is not just raw material access, but supply-chain depth. Fastmarkets estimates the EU will need a minimum of 800 GWh of lithium-ion power in 2030 for electric vehicles, energy storage systems, and other electronics, which roughly corresponds to 540,000 metric tons of lithium, 418,000 metric tons of graphite, and 45,000 metric tons of cobalt. Saudi Arabia’s pitch aligns with that kind of planning because it emphasizes processing and downstream manufacturing, where bottlenecks often appear even in mineral-rich countries. In that sense, a Saudi Arabia EU critical raw materials partnership can be framed as a value-chain integration agenda, not a simple buyer-seller relationship.
Recent engagement shows how mineral diplomacy can translate into concrete initiatives. In May, the US and Saudi Arabia signed a cooperation agreement on critical minerals mining and processing. CSIS also reports a Strategic Framework for Cooperation on securing uranium, metals, permanent magnets, and critical mineral supply chains, designed to facilitate two-way investment, and says the U.S. Department of Defense, renamed the Department of War, will finance a 49% equity stake in a new rare earths refinery in Saudi Arabia. On the European side, Saudi Arabia’s Cabinet approved a formal Declaration of Intent between the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources and France’s Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry, reinforcing the case for EU-linked industrial cooperation under the CRM Act’s diversification logic.
When did the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act enter into force?
Why does the EU prioritize diversification under the Critical Raw Materials Act?
What targets and investment commitments support Saudi Arabia’s minerals strategy?
How does an EU–Saudi critical minerals partnership fit the CRM Act approach?
What EU demand signals highlight the need for new supply-chain partners?